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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Considerable research has been devoted to the manner
in which depressives engage in interpersonal interactions,
and the way depressives approach tasks and other performance
demands.

Many researchers have found that depressives

interact with their environments, and with other individuals
in those environments, in ways that differ significantly
from the behaviors of nondepressives.
Arkin (1981) suggests that some individuals have a
"protective" orientation in interpersonal interactions.

In

contrast with people who have an "acquisitive" (social
approval-seeking) self-presentational style, those with a
protective self-presentational style focus on what may be
lost during an interaction with others instead of what might
be gained.

As a result, they are motivated to behave in a

manner which is organized around protection from potential
interpersonal and intrapersonal harm; essentially, they
avoid encounters which may hold a potential threat to their
self-concept.
Hill, Weary and Williams (1986) propose an
interpersonal self-presentation formulation for depressives,
based on Arkin's (1981) work.

Hill et al. (1986} contend

that many characteristic attributes of depressed
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individuals, such as self-doubt, low self-concept, and
social anxiety, exacerbate the concern depressives
experience about being evaluated in an interpersonal
context.

This apprehension, it is argued, causes them to

embrace a protective self-presentation style.

This style

characterizes their stance across a variety of social
encounters and may be manifested in a variety of ways, such
as inordinate modesty, social reticence, and social
avoidance and withdrawal.

The underlying goal of this

protective style of depressives is to avoid performance
demands and obligations by controlling interpersonal
relationships.

As a result, social situations that may

threaten the self-concept are avoided.
Further, based on their review of related literature,
Hill et al. (1986) assert that depressives attribute poor
performance to internal causes (e.g., lack of ability),
particularly in public conditions.

These authors argue that

depressives may use these attributions as a way of
communicating their negative self-concept to others, thereby
controlling the expectations others will have of them.

Once

the expectations others might hold of them are lowered,
performance demands are reduced and thus, anticipated
threats to an already low self-concept are also reduced.
Strategic Failure Among Depressives
Weary and Williams (1990) tested the depressive selfpresentation formulation put forth by Hill et al. (i986) by
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using a manipulation in which subjects were told that they
would be asked to perform a second task if they
successfully completed an initial visual-motor skill task
within a ten-minute time limit.

This manipulation was

intended to ascertain whether subjects would "protect"
themselves from potential future failure by deliberately
failing during the first task.

Such strategic failure would

reflect a choice of short-term discomfort due to the
immediate failure, but would also enable subjects to avoid
the future performance demand and anxiety regarding
potential future loss of self-esteem.
Weary and Williams (1990) found that depressed
subjects strategically failed a simple motor task, if they
were informed that successful completion of the task would
be followed by another task.

Depressives who had no such

future performance expectancy completed the task
successfully.

Nondepressed subjects completed the task

successfully regardless of their future performance
expectancy.

If this strategic failure finding for

depressives is replicated (to date it has not been), it
would represent an important maladaptive behavior by
depressed individuals.
Self-handicapping
In an exploration of the impact of a protective
orientation on public performance, Shepperd and Arkin (1989)
investigated the relationship between self-consciousness
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(which is one aspect of depressives' self-doubt and social
anxiety) and self-handicapping.

High public self-conscious

subjects reported being highly concerned with the opinions
others form about their behavior, and being attentive to
those aspects of themselves that are available to the
scrutiny of others.

Self-handicapping refers to "the

acquisition of an impediment, or the staging of performance
conditions, so that the handicap constitutes a persuasive
impediment to successful performance and serves as a preemptive excuse for potential failure" (Shepperd & Arkin,
1989, p. 252).

Jones and Berglas (1978), who put forth the

original self-handicapping paradigm, observed that subjects
self-handicap only for those domains in which they have
fragile, but favorable, self-concepts.

Further, self-

handicappers must succeed on occasion, lest their status
change from that of successful individuals who sometimes
perform poorly due to circumstances unrelated to their
abilities, to being considered failures.
Shepperd and Arkin (1990) found that individuals who
were high in public self-consciousness chose to handicap
their performance significantly more (by choosing to listen
to music they had been told was performance inhibiting
rather than performance enhancing or neutral) than did those
who were low in public self-consciousness, but only when the
task in which they were engaged was meaningful and
potentially self-defining (e.g., a valid indicator of
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academic and career success}.

The authors assert that self-

conscious subjects are likely to self-handicap only when the
task addresses a domain that is important to them.

Shepperd

and Arkin (1989} also asked subjects, post-task, to imagine
both failing and succeeding on the task, and to make
-

attributions as to

~hy

these performances occurred.

They

found no differences between high and low public selfconscious subjects in either external (e.g., task ease,
luck} or internal (e.g., ability, effort} attributions for
their performance.

Subjects were not asked to make

attributions regarding their actual performance.
Weary and Williams (1990} state that their strategic
failure results go beyond self-handicapping.

Depressed

subjects who failed were less likely than nondepressed
subjects to attribute their performance to the difficulty of
the task (an opportunity to excuse their performance due to
an external handicap of task difficulty}, and they
strategically failed.

Weary and Williams (1990} assert that

these subjects did not want their failures excused; the
subjects were more concerned about controlling the outcome
and avoiding a future performance demand (and an anticipated
future threat to self-esteem} than they were about failing
the initial task (and protecting themselves from temporary
and immediate emotional discomfort due to task failure}.

As

mentioned earlier, however, Shepperd and Arkin (1989} found
that highly self-conscious individuals tended to self-
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handicap only when the task in which they were engaged was
meaningful and potentially self-defining.

The visual-motor

skills task that Weary and Williams (1990) employed was not
likely to be experienced as meaningful or potentially selfdef ining, which may account for the lack of depressive selfhandicapping attributions.

Further, depressed subjects

should not be expected, based on the findings of past
research (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman,
Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979), to engage in selfhandicapping by attributing poor performance to external
factors.

Typically, depressives are more likely to make

internal attributions for poor outcomes, and external
attributions for positive events (Abramson et al., 1978;
Seligman et al., 1979).
There was, however, no significant difference between
depressed and nondepressed subjects in terms of internal
attributions regarding their performance (e.g., lack of
effort or ability).

Weary and Williams (1990) note that the

behavioral presentation style of depressives who failed
strategically did not carry over to their causal
attributions for their performance.

It is not clear,

however, that this is actually the case.

If a depressive

who failed rated his or her performance as "very much" due
to his or her level of ability (for depressives who failed,
this would mean lack of ability), and a nondepressive who
succeeded made the same performance attribution (in ·this
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case the rating would mean strong ability), these identical
performance attributions (which would yield no significant
group effects) would nonetheless mean very different things.
The depressive would be making internal attributions about a
negative trait and outcome, and the nondepressive would be
making internal attributions about a positive trait and
outcome.
Finally, it should be noted that Weary and Williams'
(1990) depressed and nondepressed subjects did not actually
perform any differently than Shepperd and Arkin's (1989)
high and low self-conscious subjects, despite Weary and
William's (1990) argument to the contrary.

In both studies,

subjects did impede their performance behaviorally;
depressives in the strategic failure condition exceeded the
time limit in Weary and Williams (1990) study, and high
self-conscious subjects in Shepperd and Arkin's (1989) study
chose performance inhibiting music when engaged in a task
that was meaningful and potentially self-defining.

However,

neither group appeared to make self-handicapping
attributions for their performances.

Weary and Williams

(1990) stated that it was this lack of an attempt to excuse
poor performance that set their strategic f ailers apart from
Shepperd and Arkin's (1989) self-handicappers.

Actually,

subjects in both studies sought to impede their performances
behaviorally, and did not offer any attributions regarding
their performances.

What would have really set Weary and
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Williams (1990) subjects apart, however, would have been an
actual test of what

~

differentiate between self-

handicappers and strategic failers--the former should seek
to succeed on occasion, and the latter should seek failure
consistently.

Research on the differences between self-

handicapping and strategic failure, and depressive and
nondepressive attributions during such manipulations, is
indicated.
Weary and Williams (1990) conclude that depressives
fail intentionally in an effort to avoid future performance
demands that may be imposed upon them by others, despite the
fact that such failure causes them at least short-term
emotional discomfort.

These authors speculate that

depressives choose immediate failure in order to preserve
their tenuously maintained self-esteem from further damage
due to anticipated future failures.
Further, Weary and Williams (1990) state that while
depressive behaviors are not "simply" manipulative, a
consciously manipulative component exists, in that
depressive behaviors can be considered "strategic
communications" which may be used "to control and direct
interpersonal processes" (p. 897).

Weary and Williams'

(1990) results, however, do not provide evidence of
conscious intent; the authors make no distinction between
conscious pursuit of failure and failure that may be
actively, but unconsciously, pursued.

In fact, the·
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depressives in Weary and Williams' (1990) strategic failure
condition indicated that they believed their performance was
average compared to other subjects (H=4.5 on a nine-point
scale).
It is also important to note that Weary and Williams
(1990) set out to test an interpersonal theory using a
visual-motor skill task.

In an attempt to account for this

deficiency and "heighten the atmosphere of evaluation"
(Weary & Williams, 1990, p. 894), the experimenter sat
directly opposite the subjects, tracked their time with a
stopwatch, and pretended to make notes.

Despite these

efforts at injecting interpersonal elements into their
research, the fact remains that strategic failure
manipulations with depressed subjects still have yet to be
conducted using an actual interpersonal task.
Strategic Failure and Anxiety
Others have observed that people with high levels of
social anxiety strategically fail in order to decrease
expectations held for their future performances (Baumgardner

& Brownlee, 1987).

Baumgardner and Brownlee's (1987)

research with socially anxious subjects demonstrated that
these subjects strategically failed when informed that their
verbal and social acuity was being assessed, and that their
performance could alter currently high expectations held by
the experimenter for their performance in a future
interaction. These authors propose that socially anxious
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individuals are motivated to fail strategically in order to
confirm their own expectations of themselves and to induce
others' expectations of them to become consistent with their
own, and "also to lower and create a safer level of future
standards" (Baumgardner & Brownlee, 1987, p. 534).
The current study also examines whether a relationship
exists between subject anxiety and strategic failure, and
whether this relationship differs from that observed for
depression.
In sum, strategic failure theorists propose that
depressed (and anxious) individuals will fail immediate
performance demands and endure subsequent short-term
assaults to their self-esteem, in order to prevent long-term
performance demands and anticipated failures and the anxiety
and demoralization associated with these failures.
Self-Verification Among Depressives
In addition to creating negative results through
strategic failure, depressives and occasionally dysphorics
(i.e., individuals who are not clinically depressed but
experience depressed mood) indicate they are more inclined
than nondepressives to seek unfavorable feedback (Swann,
Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992).

Further, they do so

despite the fact that such feedback is associated with
heightened painful affect (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, and
Gaines, 1987; Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992).
contrast with strategic failure and self-handicapping

In
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theorists, these authors state that depressives
unconsciously seek out, rather than avoid, threats to selfesteem and that they do so in order to verify their selfconcepts, thereby increasing their sense of existential
predictability and control.

Thus, the motivation for self-

verification is much the same as it is for strategic
failure--creating a sense of future emotional security for
the depressive by controlling the immediate intra- and
interpersonal environments.
Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992) state that
self-verification theory represents a departure from
consistency theory (see Aronson, 1968, Festinger, 1957,
Lecky, 1947, Secord & Backman, 1965; c.f. Swann, Wenzlaff,
Krull, & Pelham, 1992).

Consistency theory proposes that

people are invested in preserving their self-conceptions and
seek out feedback that is consistent with those selfconceptions to accomplish this.

Self-verification theory,

in contrast, proposes that while people do strive to
maintain consistency by verifying their firmly-held selfconcepts, they do so not only for the sake of maintaining
consistency, but also "out of a desire to maximize their
perceptions of prediction and control" (p. 293).

Thus,

people with negative self-views (depressives and people with
low self-esteem) create and maintain interpersonal
relationships and situations that reinforce their negative
self-views, and they do so "out of a nonconscious desire to
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bolster their perceptions of existential security and
interpersonal control" (p. 304).
Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992, p. 303) add
that people who "become convinced that they are worthless
externalize this belief by bringing their relationship
partners to share this appraisal of them and, ultimately,
reject them (emphasis in original)."

As a result, their

negative self-views are verified in their interpersonal
interactions.

While these authors' findings (discussed

below) cannot be said to have demonstrated a causal
relationship on this last point, it does lead to interesting
questions (e.g., the development of transference and
countertransference in the therapeutic alliance, the
dynamics of abusive relationships, etc.) which merit further
study.

Further, Swann, Stein-seroussi, and Giesler (1992)

note that self-verification theory does not propose that
individuals who involve themselves in negative and even
abusive self-verifying relationships are actually attaining
security and control.

Rather, they contend that such

individuals seek to maximize their perceptions of control.
Before elaborating on Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and
Pelham's (1992) findings, a bit of groundwork is in order.
In an early study of self-verification focused on
interpersonal behavior, Swann and Ely (1984) described the
difference between self-verification and behavioral
confirmation in an interpersonal context.

In their ·analysis

13

of interpersonal dynamics, the term "target" is used to
describe an actor in a situation whose behavior is assessed
by a "perceiver."

These authors investigated which of the

following interpersonal dynamics is more likely to occur
under certain conditions: (1) self-verification, or
(2) behavioral con{irmation. , If self-verification was the
dominant dynamic, the target would behave in a way intended
to cause the perceiver to revise previously held
expectations about the target, to expectations that verified
the target's self-view.

If targets instead engaged in

behavioral confirmation, they would behave in a manner that
confirmed the expectations of the perceiver.

Swann and Ely

(1984) observed that the desire for self-verification can be
so powerful that when a "battle of wills" ensues between the
expectations of a perceiver and the target, it is often the
target who maneuvers to victory.

This suggests that self-

verification is a more influential motivator than behavioral
confirmation.
Swann and Ely (1984) paired targets who were either
extraverted or introverted with perceivers who had been led
to believe by the experimenters that the targets were the
opposite of what they actually were (e.g., an introverted
target would be matched with a perceiver who was told the
target had been evaluated and was judged to be extraverted).
These authors assessed the targets' level of certainty
regarding their own extraversion or introversion, and also
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manipulated the perceivers' level of certainty (high or low
certainty) for targets' status as extraverts or introverts.
The perceivers then interviewed the targets over three
sessions to assess target extraversion or introversion
(using topics supplied by the experimenters) and arrived at
their own determination.

Swann and Ely (1984) found that

when perceivers formed expectations about targets, and the
targets were aware of a discrepancy between their selfconcepts and the perceivers' expectations, "the targets
continued to behave in a self-consistent manner despite
pressure to behave otherwise from perceivers, [and]
perceivers abandoned their efforts to uncover evidence to
support their expectancies" (Swann & Ely, 1984, p.1298).
This was most apparent in those conditions in which the
targets were relatively certain of their self-view, and also
when both they and the perceiver were uncertain of the
degree to which the target was extraverted or introverted.
In fact, targets caused perceivers who were low in certainty
to completely revise their initial beliefs about the
targets.
In a later study, Swann, Pelham and Krull (1989) found
that both subjects with low self-esteem and those with high
self-esteem seek favorable feedback regarding their positive
self-views (enhancing and verifying), and also seek
unfavorable feedback to verify their negative self-views
(non-enhancing and verifying).

Thus, these subjects sought
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verifying feedback regardless of whether it was favorable or
unfavorable.

However, only people with very negative self-

views preferred negative feedback (non-enhancing but selfverifying) when forced to choose between enhancing but nonverifying and non-enhancing but verifying feedback.

Those

with only slightly negative self-views appeared to have
their self-verification strivings somewhat attenuated by
self-enhancement strivings.

These authors conclude that

people with low self-esteem are "sometimes caught in a
crossfire between their desire for self-enhancement and
their desire for self-verification, a conflict they at least
sometimes resolve in favor of self-verification" (Swann et
al., 1989, p.789).
Now, the results alluded to previously in the
introduction to self-verification will be presented.

In a

series of four studies of the self-verification process
among dysphorics and depressives, Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull,
and Pelham (1992) obtained several noteworthy findings.
First, they state that depressives preferred to meet with an
evaluator who had rated them unfavorably, while dysphorics
preferred to meet with a favorable evaluator and
nondepressives demonstrated an even stronger preference to
meet with a favorable evaluator.

One must note, however,

that it is not clear from the presentation of their findings
whether subjects actually preferred what they chose, as
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people often make choices based on factors other than their
true preferences.
Second, when asked to indicate how they would like
friends and dating partners to view them, nondepressives
chose very positive ratings, dysphorics chose less positive
ratings, and depressives chose still less positive ratings.
In the third study, subjects were asked whether they
wished to see favorable or unfavorable evaluations of
themselves on several domains, with these evaluations being
provided by their roommates.

Dysphorics chose equally among

favorable and unfavorable evaluations, while nondepressives
were much more likely to choose favorable feedback.

Swann,

Wenzlaff, Pelham, and Krull {1992) note that negative
feedback-seeking is associated with eventual rejection by
roommates.

The authors attempt to make a causal inference

based on this finding, that is, that negative feedback
seeking generates rejection, further verifying depressives'
negative self-views.

However, this inference is not

warranted given the correlational nature of their data.
Finally, in the fourth study, subjects were given
favorable, unfavorable or no feedback from anonymous
evaluators ostensibly based on subjects' performance
(reading aloud an excerpt of a literary work).

Subjects who

received unfavorable feedback reported more anxious and
depressed mood than subjects in the other conditions.
completing the mood measures, subjects were allowed to

After
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choose to look at some of the items comprising their
evaluation.

Subjects with negative self-concepts were more

likely to choose unfavorable and neutral feedback, while
persons with positive self-concepts were more likely to
choose favorable feedback.

Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and

Pelham (1992) note that people with negative self-concepts
chose unfavorable feedback despite the fact that such
feedback elicited a painful affective state.
Comments written in response to the Swann, Wenzlaff,
Pelham, and Krull (1992) publication argue that, rather than
making a strong case for depressive self-verification, the
really interesting results of these four studies have to do
with the powerful preference of nondepressives for favorable
feedback and evaluators.

Alloy and Lipman (1992) observe

that the consistent trend in Swann, Wenzlaff, Pelham and
Krull's (1992) four studies is that "depressed or negative
self-concept subjects appear to prefer neutral or mixed
(favorable and unfavorable) appraisals, whereas nondepressed
or positive self-concept subjects show a consistent and
strong bias for favorable feedback" (p. 311).

Alloy and

Lipman (1992) state, "Indeed, it may be depressives' failure
to show a strong preference for positive feedback rather
than a bias for negative feedback that contributes to
vulnerability to depression onset and maintenance" (p. 311).
Hooley and Richters (1992) were more critical of
Swann, Wenzlaff, Pelham and Krull's (1992) work.

These
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authors argue that the Swann, Wenzlaff, Pelham, and Krull
(1992) studies have methodological problems and
interpretations that result in conclusions that overstep the
limitations of the data.

These problems include defining

nondepressed subjects as those who score a "O" on the Beck
Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh,
1961) short form, which Hooley and Richters (1992) state
"would yield a rather atypical group of subjects, probably
including repressors--deniers, hypomanics, and cheerleaders"
(p. 308).

These authors also note that Swann, Wenzlaff,

Pelham, and Krull (1992) use the terms depressive and
dysphoric somewhat loosely and sometimes interchangeably.
Hooley and Richters (1992) state that what Swann, Wenzlaff,
Pelham, and Krull (1992) have provided are "valuable
insights into the ways in which some nondepressed persons
may lower their risk of becoming depressed" (p. 309).

These

authors assert, as do Alloy and Lipman (1992), that what
remains to be determined is whether "the absence of this
Pollyanna-like behavior is involved in the development or
maintenance of depression in its clinical or subclinical
forms" ( 1992, p. 309) •
Swann, Wenzlaff, and Tafarodi (1992) promptly rebutted
these comments with two additional studies addressing the
most significant concerns of the above-mentioned
commentators.

In both studies, the authors improved their

group inclusion criteria, were more precise in their
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labelling of dysphorics, and improved their methodology to
reflect more accurately whether self-verification is
motivated behavior.

In the first study, nondysphoric and

dysphoric subjects were told they had been evaluated during
a getting-acquainted process.
was favorable,

othe~s

Some were told the evaluation

were told it was unfavorable.

Subjects were given a choice between interacting with their
evaluator or participating in an unrelated experiment.

They

then responded to written items addressing the mechanisms
underlying their choices.

Most nondysphoric subjects chose

to interact with their evaluator when evaluated favorably
and chose another experiment (i.e., no interaction) when
evaluated unfavorably.

In contrast, most dysphorics chose

to interact when evaluated unfavorably and chose to do
another experiment when evaluated favorably.

Participants

indicated they were more interested in interacting with the
evaluator when they believed the evaluation described them
accurately, supporting the self-verification hypothesis.
Further, analyses of desire to change the evaluator's
opinion and to improve themselves through interaction with
the evaluator suggested that neither of these factors
motivated dysphoric subjects to choose to interact with the
unfavorable evaluator.
The second study addressed the question of whether
subjects are motivated to self-verify.

Dysphorics and

nondysphorics were told they would be interviewed by the
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experimenter and evaluated by three persons listening from
an adjacent room.

Two evaluations were ostensibly based on

subjects' personality and were always either favorable
(assumed to be congruent for nondysphorics, and discrepant
for dysphorics) or unfavorable (assumed to be congruent for
dysphorics, discrepant for nondysphorics).

After subjects

examined these, they were told the third evaluation
concerned different domains (assessment of artistic and
athletic abilities based on verbal style), and they were
asked to rank-order the degree to which they were interested
in receiving feedback on their strengths and limitations in
these domains.

(Screening conducted prior to the study led

to a sample in which only subjects who rated themselves as
artistic but not athletic or vice versa had been recruited.)
Swann, Wenzlaff, and Tafarodi (1992) found that receiving
unfavorable/self-discrepant feedback caused nondysphorics to
be less likely to seek feedback about their limitations.

In

contrast, receiving favorable/self-discrepant feedback
caused dysphorics to seek feedback about their limitations.
These authors conclude that when the subjective validity of
dysphoric subjects' self-perceptions was challenged, they
tended to seek unfavorable feedback that was reaffirming of
those self-perceptions.
Swann, Wenzlaff, and Tafarodi (1992) contend that
depressive and dysphoric "evenhandedness" (Alloy & Lipman,
1992) cannot account for the fact that in the first study,
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dysphorics preferred interacting with a negative evaluator
over being in another experiment, nor can it account for
dysphorics seeking negative evaluations when their negative
self-perception was challenged.

Further, it does not

explain why depressed subjects in Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull,
and Pelham's (1992) study (the first in the series of four)
chose an unfavorable evaluator over a favorable one.
In sum, Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992)
assert that depressive self-verification is an unconscious
process of verifying and inducing others to verify one's own
identity, such that depressed individuals are able to
maintain a predictable view of themselves and their role in
the world.
positive.

Their self-view is stable and secure, but not
Thus, these authors offer a non-pejorative

perspective that contrasts with authors who have referred to
depressive social interactions as consciously manipulative
(e.g., "strategic failure" described by Weary & Williams,
1990), focused on achieving pathological satisfactions
(Bonime, 1960), and emotional blackmail (Fenichel, 1945).
Intent of Current Research
The research summarized above suggests several aspects
of strategic failure and self-verification among depressed
individuals which merit further study.

To this end, a 2 x 2

x 2 factorial design that crossed future performance
expectancy, either present or absent (the strategic failure
manipulation), and success/failure expectancy (the self-
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verification manipulation) among depressed and nondepressed
individuals, was conducted.
Subjects were assessed to determine whether they were
depressed or nondepressed using the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI).

To determine whether subjects perceived

themselves to be depressed or nondepressed, subjects
indicated in writing where they would place themselves on a
continuum ranging from not depressed to severely depressed.
Only those subjects who accurately stated (with BDI scores
as the criterion) that they belong in a depressed or
nondepressed category were included in the primary analyses,
as these subjects were consciously depressed or not
depressed, which is important in terms of investigating
strategic failure and self-verification.

For example, only

those depressed subjects who perceived themselves to be
depressed would be motivated to self-verify their depressive
state when told that depressives succeed or depressives fail
a given task.

This indirect process of depressed versus

nondepressed classification (rather than a direct diagnostic
statement being given by the experimenter to subjects) was
also utilized to prevent any influencing of subject
performance which might have resulted from their perception
of experimenter expectations.

Had subjects been told that

the experimenter had classified them as depressed or not
depressed, they may have engaged in behavioral confirmation
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rather than self-verification (i.e., confirming the
experimenter's view of them).
The independent variable of future performance
expectancy was manipulated such that: (1) half of the
depressives and half of the nondepressives were informed
that if they succeeded on a task, they would perform another
similar task; and (2) the other subjects were not given any
information about a future task.

According to the strategic

failure hypothesis, those subjects with a future performance
expectancy who are depressed are more likely to fail the
task than other subjects.
Two levels of the independent variable of expectancy
of success/failure were employed.

Subjects who were

depressed were told either that depressed people succeed at
the task or that they fail; nondepressed subjects were told
either that nondepressed people succeed at the task or that
they fail.

Thus, depressives were told about "depressive

performance" and nondepressives were told how people who are
not depressed perform.

It was important that the statement

from the experimenter about success or failure expectation
corresponded to the way subjects perceived themselves (i.e.,
depressed or not depressed}; if they were discrepant, the
manipulation which hypothetically would lead to depressive
self-verification would not be effective.

Subjects whose

perceptions did not correspond to their BDI scores (i.e.,
depressed subjects who did not perceive themselves as
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depressed) were placed in a condition corresponding to their
perceptions rather than their actual BDI classification.
Again, these subjects were not included in the primary
analyses.

According to the self-verification hypothesis,

subjects should verify their self-view by succeeding if
given the success expectancy or by failing if given the
failure expectancy.
This experiment employed an interpersonal task;
subjects engaged in a sorting task with a peer (actually a
confederate).

Subjects and confederates were told that they

had been randomly assigned to their respective experimental
roles.

However, subjects were always the "sorters" and

confederates were always the "timer/transcribers."

Subject-

sorters were given a stack of 18 cards, each printed with a
different word.

Subjects were told to sort the cards into

pairs of similar words (e.g., blue-red, car-plane, etc.)
making the best possible match.

Subjects had two minutes to

complete this portion of the task.

The confederate timed

the subject, indicated agreement with the subject's matching
efforts if the subject succeeded and disagreement if not,
and transcribed the subject's results.

Obviously, a task in

which the confederate could have a direct impact on outcome
could not be utilized, nor could a task which many subjects
might legitimately fail due to its complexity or required
skill level.
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The intent of this research is to test several
hypotheses:
(1) that depressed individuals will differ from nondepressed
individuals in their performance on a task, depending on
whether they believe their initial performance may generate
future performance demands (i.e., determining if and to what
degree depressed subjects strategically fail);
(a) that strategic failure is associated with increased
negative affect, as demonstrated by previous research;
(2) The manipulation of success/failure expectancy is
intended to demonstrate whether depressives and
nondepressives are motivated to self-verify;
(a) depressed subjects who are told that depressives succeed
are predicted to succeed on the task, whereas depressives
who are told that depressives fail are expected to fail;
(b) nondepressed subjects who are told that nondepressives
succeed are predicted to succeed on the task, as are
nondepressives who are told that nondepressives fail.
(c) depressive self-verifying behaviors are expected to be
associated with increased negative affect, as demonstrated
by previous research;
(3) When given an opportunity to choose either positive or
negative feedback from their task partner, depressed
individuals are expected to choose feedback that is negative
and therefore self-verifying, and nondepressed subjects are
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expected to choose feedback that is positive and selfenhancing, supporting the self-verification hypothesis.
If the motivation to self-verify is overriding for
both depressives and nondepressives, they should perform
according to the success/failure expectancy they were given,
yielding a main effect of success/failure expectancy.

In

contrast, if depressives did not succeed regardless of
success/failure expectancy m;: future performance expectancy,
they would demonstrate that failure in and of itself is
integral to the depressive self-view, yielding a main effect
of group such that depressives consistently fail and
nondepressives succeed.

If subjects in the future

performance expectancy condition tend to fail regardless of
their status as depressed/nondepressed and what they have
been told about depressive/nondepressive tendencies to
succeed or to fail, they will demonstrate a main effect of
future performance expectancy in which future tasks are
generally avoided.

Such a finding would be highly unlikely,

but if obtained would indicate that the experimental
subjects (unlike pilot subjects) found the task boring or
too difficult.
If depressed subjects in the future performance
condition strategically fail relative to both depressed
subjects in the no future performance condition and
nondepressed subjects in either condition (regardless of
what success/failure expectancy condition they were in),
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this group by future performance expectancy interaction
would replicate Weary and Williams (1990), with an
interpersonal task instead of a visual-motor task.
If depressed subjects verify their depressive status
by succeeding or failing depending on which expectancy
-

condition they are_in, and nondepressives strive to succeed
regardless of expectancy condition, these results will yield
a group x success/failure expectancy interaction.

These

variables have not been manipulated in this manner in
previous studies, but it is hypothesized that nondepressives
may be more inclined to succeed regardless of the expectancy
of success/failure information they have been given.
Another possible interaction is between future
performance expectancy and success/failure expectancy.
These variables have never been manipulated together in a
single research design, and may provide illuminating
information regarding whether strategic failure or selfverif ication is the greater motivating force.

Moreover,

subject group may interact with these two variables to
create a three-way interaction.

Again, given that strategic

failure and self-verification are conceptual variables that
have not been investigated together in previous studies, it
is difficult to predict a priori whether depressed and
nondepressed subjects will respond differently to the
combination of future performance and success/failure
expectancies.

CHAPTER II
METHOD
Materials
Current depression.

To determine whether subjects

were depressed or nondepressed, they completed the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock &
Erbaugh, 1961).

The BDI has been widely used both for

assessing the severity of depression in clinically diagnosed
clients, as well as for detecting depression in normal
populations (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988).

The BDI has

demonstrated internal reliabilities with nonpsychiatric
samples ranging from .73 to .92, with a mean coefficient
alpha of .81.

Test-retest reliabilities range from .60 to

.90. (Beck et al., 1988).

The BDI has also demonstrated

high levels of concurrent and construct validity.
Self-perception of depression.

Subjects also

indicated on a single-item questionnaire whether they
believe they are severely depressed, moderately depressed,
mildly depressed or not depressed.

These categories were

used to reflect Beck, Steer and Garbin's (1988) categories
for depressive symptomatology.

Based on construct

validation studies, people with BDI scores of 0-9 are viewed
as not or minimally depressed, people with scores in the
28
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10-18 range are described as mildly to moderately depressed,
scores of 19-29 reflect moderate to severe depression, and
scores of 30-63 indicate severe depressive symptomatology.
Thus, for depressed subjects to be "consistent" in the
present study, they were required to have a BDI score
greater than nine and to indicate that they were at least
"mildly depressed."

Nondepressed subjects in the study were

included in the primary analyses if their BDI scores were
nine or less and if they indicated they were not depressed.
Vulnerability to depression.

Subjects completed the

Depression Proneness Inventory (DPI; Kayne, Alloy, Romer, &
crocker, 1986).

The DPI is a 10-item, face-valid scale

which measures general susceptibility to depression.

This

measure uses a seven-point scale with endpoints specific to
each question.

The DPI has been found to have high test-

retest reliability

(~=.88)

and good internal consistency,

with coefficient alphas ranging from .90 to .92.

This

measure identified whether subjects are prone to
experiencing depression and provides an indication of
characterological responses that may make individuals
vulnerable to depression.

This measure was used to provide

some indication as to whether subjects who were not
currently experiencing depression (as measured by the BDI)
are depression-prone, and also provided some indication as
to whether any subjects who were currently experiencing
depression might be experiencing a reactive depression
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rather than a chronic or recurring depression.

Furthermore,

if no effects of depression status (i.e., depressed or not
depressed) were observed, additional analyses were planned
to examine whether strategic failure and self-verification
effects would be observed as a function of depression
proneness.
state-Trait anxiety.

Subjects were given the State-

Trait Anxiety Inventory-Form Y (STAI-Y; Spielberger,
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983).

The STAI-Y has

been widely used in both clinical and research contexts.
Analysis of the reliability of the State and Trait scales
for male and female college students yielded coefficient
alphas of .90 to .93.

Results with similarly high

reliability have been demonstrated with other populations.
High in face validity, the STAI-Y has also demonstrated
evidence of construct, concurrent and convergent validity.
Subjects indicate the degree to which they agree with
statements describing current and general anxiety levels on
4-point scales.

The STAI-Y form is labelled "Self-

Evaluation Questionnaire" to avoid subjects responding to
the demand characteristics that could occur for a
questionnaire identified as an anxiety measure.

The STAI-Y

was administered to provide another reliable measure of
group differences, and to assess if anxiety is a
contributing variable in strategic failure, as suggested by
previous research.
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Transient mood states.

Subjects completed the

Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL; Zuckerman &
Lubin, 1965) twice, once prior to the experimental
manipulations and again after engaging in the interpersonal
task.

The MAACL is a widely used and brief questionnaire

which was designed to measure affective states
(specifically, depression, anxiety and hostility).

The

MAACL has demonstrated good internal reliability with
college students, ranging from .79 to .92 (Today form;
Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965).

The MAACL was administered to

assess subjects' affective response to their performance on
the task, and whether affective responses differed in the
future performance and success/failure expectancy
conditions.
Manipulation checks.

Prior to engaging in the

experimental task, subjects completed a two-item
questionnaire intended to provide a basic indication of
their level of motivation to succeed on the task, and their
degree of past experience with word-sorting tasks.

Subjects

were asked to rate on an 11-point scale how important it was
to them to do well on the task (0 being not at all important
and 10 being very important), and how much prior experience
they had with similar tasks (0 being no experience and 10
being a lot of experience).
Post-performance manipulation checks consisted of
several items inquiring about subjects• post-task
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perceptions and expectations.

Subjects were asked whether

they anticipated a second task based on what the
experimenter had told them and their performance on the
task.

If so, they were asked if they expected the second

task to be easier or more difficult; this question was to
test whether subjects were more likely to fail strategically
if they anticipated the second task would be more difficult
than the first.

Subjects were asked to indicate whether

they succeeded or failed at the task.

Subjects were also

asked to rate on an 11-point scale how they did on the task
(O being very poorly and 10 very well), and how they think
their performance compared to other people in the study (0
being much worse and 10 much better).
Performance attributions.

After completing the

experimental task, subjects were asked to complete a
questionnaire regarding their attributions for their
performance.

Modeled after the work of Weiner et al. (1972)

and the Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson &
Seligman, 1984), a commonly used measure of attributions in
depressives, this questionnaire required subjects to rate on
a series of 11-point scales (with o the lowest rating and 10
the highest) various factors which may have influenced their
performance.

Subjects were asked once again how important

it was to them to do well.

They were asked to what extent

they attributed their performance to factors such as luck,
ability, effort, and partner influence.

Finally, they were

33
asked if the cause of their success or failure had to do
with external factors such as other people, or to internal
factors within themselves.
Performance feedback.

Subjects were told there was

time to provide them with only one type of performance
feedback (positive

~r

negative) from their task partner.

Subjects were asked to complete a form indicating which kind
of feedback they chose to receive, and to rate on an 11point scale how important the feedback was to them.
Subjects
Volunteer subjects were obtained from the
undergraduate psychology subject pool at Loyola University
of Chicago.

A total of 230 subjects registered for the

research project; 225 subjects completed the questionnaires
and were consequently included in the study.

All subjects

received course credit as compensation for their
participation.
Subjects who scored nine or less on the Beck
Depression Inventory (Beck, et al., 1961) were classified as
nondepressed.

Subjects who scored 10 or above (ranging from

10 to 34; i.e., mildly to severely depressed according to
Beck et al., 1961) were classified as depressed.

This

classification does not mean that subjects were clinically
depressed; rather, it reflects subjects' reports of
significant depressive symptomatology.

Subjects' BDI scores

were determined to be equivalent across the performance
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expectancy and success/failure expectancy conditions, with
significance levels greater than .05.
Of the 225 subjects who provided valid responses, 148
(65.80%) were not depressed as measured by the BDI (M=4.14,
SD=2.67), and 77 (34.20%) scored 10 or above on the BDI and
were included in tne depressed group (M=l6.50, SD=5.58).

Of

the 225 subjects, 156 subjects {69.33%) were consistent with
regard to their BDI scores and their perception of whether
they were depressed.

Ninety-one of these subjects were not

depressed according to the BDI and perceived themselves as
not depressed (61.50% of the total BDI-nondepressed
subjects; M=3.60, SD=2.5).

Sixty-five subjects were

depressed according to the BDI and perceived themselves as
depressed (84.40% of the total SDI-depressed subjects;
M=l7.42, SD=5.50).
Depressed and nondepressed subjects differed
considerably in terms of self-reported depression proneness
(M=39.20 and M=25.82, respectively, E(l,148)=27.708,
R<.0001), as measured by the DPI (Kayne, et al., 1986).
There were no differences in depression proneness for the
future performance expectancy and success/failure expectancy
conditions.

Additionally, subjects were consistent in terms

of corresponding BDI and DPI scores.

Among 156 subjects, 56

subjects were depressed (based on BDI scores) and were also
depression-prone (based on a median split of DPI scores),
and 67 subjects were not depressed and were not depression-
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prone.

Nine subjects were depressed but not depression-

prone, and 24 subjects were not depressed but depressionprone.
Group differences were observed for both state
anxiety,

~(1,148)=205.05,

R<.0001, and trait anxiety,

F(l,148)=187.855, R<.0001, as measured by the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory-Form Y (STAI-Y; Spielberger, et al.,
1983).

Depressed subjects scored higher in state anxiety

(M=60.38) than nondepressed subjects (M=42.15), and
depressed subjects reported more anxious traits (M=60.94)
than nondepressed subjects (M=42.81).

No other main effects

or interactions involving future performance and
success/failure expectancies were observed for anxiety
scores.
As suggested by the above group differences, positive
correlations were obtained between BDI and DPI scores
(~=.65,

R<.01), and between BDI scores and state anxiety

(r=.76, R<.01) and trait anxiety

(~=.77,

R<.01).

These

findings suggest that subjects who were depressed at the
time of the experiment, as measured by the BDI, were also
more prone to depression and anxiety as measured by the
personality measures, than were nondepressives.

Thus, the

depressed subjects in this sample may not have been
experiencing a reactive depression, but instead may have
personality characteristics that make them more vulnerable
to affective disturbance such as depression and anxiety.
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These results are consistent with the findings reported
earlier regarding a high degree of correspondence between
subjects• BDI and DPI scores.
The high correlation between BDI and DPI scores is
important in terms of establishing depression in this sample
as a relatively stable affective vulnerability, with
associated depressive identification and cognitions which
would be expected to contribute to strategic failure and
self-verification strivings.

The data regarding high

correlations between BDI and anxiety scores is important in
examining the impact of depression

v~rsus

anxiety on

strategic failure; for example, it may turn out that
conceptualizing strategic failure in terms of a mixed
anxiety-depression diagnosis is more appropriate.
Procedure
The research process was briefly described to each
subject.

Subjects then completed the Informed Consent

document, the BDI, the DPI, the single-item questionnaire
that assessed subjects' perceptions of their depression
status, the STAI-Y, the MAACL (Time 1), and the PreManipulation Check questionnaire.
When these measures were completed, subjects were
asked to place them in an envelope and give them to the
experimenter.

The experimenter briefly exited to another

room to determine whether each subject met the criterion for
depression (based on BDI scores) and whether they perceived
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themselves (based on the depression self-perception item) as
depressed or nondepressed.

Before exiting, the subject was

told that the experimenter was leaving to check on the
progress of another subject in an adjacent room and would
return shortly.

Subjects were not made aware that the

experimenter had read the completed questionnaires while in
the adjacent room.
When the experimenter returned, subjects were told
they would be participating in a research project that would
require them to engage in an interpersonal task with a peer
(actually one of a group of confederates who participated in
this study; subjects were matched with same-gender
confederates).

Half of the depressed and half of the

nondepressed subjects were informed that if they succeeded
on a task, they would perform another such task; the other
subjects were not given any future performance expectancy.
These instructions served as the manipulation of future
performance expectancy in order to test the strategic
failure hypothesis.

Next, subjects who were depressed were

told either that depressed people succeed at this task or
that they do not; nondepressed subjects were told either
that nondepressed people succeed at this task or that they
do not.

These latter instructions manipulated

success/failure expectancy in order to test the selfverif ication manipulation.
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The subject and confederate (the latter waited in an
adjacent room, ostensibly completing questionnaires) were
introduced, and told that they had been randomly assigned to
their respective experimental conditions.

However, the

subject was always the "sorter" and the confederate was
always the "timer/transcriber."

The subject-sorter was then

given a stack of 18 cards, each printed with a different
word.

All subjects received the stack of cards in the same

random order.

Each subject was told to sort the cards into

pairs of words (red-blue, table-chair, son-daughter, dogcat, sock-shoe, student-teacher, hand-foot, apple-banana,
car-plane), making the best possible match.

Subjects were

also told they must finish this task within a two-minute
time limit.

success was determined by correct sorting of

the cards, and completing the sorting task within the twominute time limit.

Pilot testing of this task revealed that

subjects were able to correctly match the pairs within the
allotted time.
After the subject completed the task, the confederate
either indicated agreement with the subject's sorting of the
cards (if the subject succeeded at the task) or indicated
how the subject might have correctly sorted the cards (if
the subject failed the task).

The confederate, rather than

the experimenter, provided this feedback so that subjects•
perception of their performance was not altered by
confirmation or disconf irmation by an "authority" who might
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have been perceived as engaging in an experimental
manipulation.

Further, the confederate's evaluative

comments heightened the interpersonal element of the task.
The subject then recited the pairs as he or she had matched
them to the confederate, who transcribed the results.
The subject then completed the MAACL again (Time 2),
and filled out the performance attribution and postperformance manipulation check questionnaires.

The

confederate also feigned completing the questionnaires.
When the questionnaires were completed, subject and
confederate were told they were going to evaluate each other
on several dimensions, with half of the evaluation focusing
on their perception of positive qualities of their partner,
and half on negative qualities.

They were also told that

the experimenter would make their partner's feedback
available to them, although time constraints allowed only
for providing one part of the evaluation, either the
positive or the negative part.

Subjects and confederates

were shown the mock evaluation forms.

They were then asked

to indicate on the Feedback Information form whether they
would choose the negative or the positive part of the
evaluation from their partner, and to rate on a Likert-type
scale the extent to which they would prefer this feedback.
In fact, no feedback was provided to subjects.

40

These forms were collected, and subjects were then
thoroughly debriefed as to the nature of the experiment and
dismissed.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Demographic data for the subjects are given in Table
1.

Table 2

provide~

a breakdown of the number of subjects

in each of the eight experimental conditions.

Table 2 is

comprised of data from consistent subjects only, that is,
depressed subjects (based on BDI scores} who identified
themselves as depressed and nondepressed subjects who
identified themselves as nondepressed.
Pre-Performance Manipulation Checks
Prior to beginning the task, subjects were asked how
important it was to them to do well on the task and how much
experience they had with this type of task (i.e., word
sorting tasks}; 151 subjects accurately completed this
measure.

No differences were demonstrated regarding how

important it was to subjects to do well on the task, as a
function of depression,

~(1,143}=1.20,

p>.05, whether they

were later led to expect a second task if they succeeded on
the first task,

~(1,143}=1.35,

p>.05., and whether they were

later told that people such as themselves were expected to
succeed or to fail,

~(1,143}=3.54,

p>.05.

Additionally,

there were no interactions among the group, future
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Table 1
Demographic Data
consistent Subjects
(N=156)

Total Subjects
CH=225)

Gender
Female
Male

78.2%
21.8%

76.0%
24.0%

Mean Age
(in years)

19.3

19.3

Education completed
(in years)
12
13
14
15
16
Missing

44.2%
22.4%
10.3%
6.4%
1.3%
15.4%

43.6%
20.0%
11.1%
6.7%
1.3%
17.3%

Depression Status (BDI)
Severe
1.3%
Moderate
21.7%
Mild
18.5%
Nondepressed
58.3%

0.9%
15.4%
17.9%
65.8%
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Table 2
Number of Subjects Per Cell (consistent subjects. N=l56)

Group

Depressed

Nondepressed

Success/Failure
Expectancy

Future Performance
Expectancy
No Future
Expectancy

Future
Expectancy

Success

13

15

Failure

16

21

Success

24

26

Failure

19

22
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performance expectancy, or success/failure expectancy
variables for task importance.
As was observed for task importance, there were no
significant differences for how much experience subjects
reported they had with this kind of task, as a function of
depression group, E(l,143)=.19, p>.05, future performance
expectancy, E(l,143)=.73, p>.05, and success/failure
expectancy,

E(l,143)=1.62, p>.05.

The eight experimental

groups may therefore be considered equivalent with regard to
the important factors of degree of motivation to do well and
prior experience with word-sorting tasks.
Post-Performance Manipulation Checks
Post-performance manipulation checks were carried out
to determine whether the manipulation of future performance
expectancy was successful.
Following the interpersonal task, subjects were asked
if they anticipated a second task.

Subjects who had been

told to expect a second task if they succeeded on the first
task, and who did succeed, should have anticipated a second
task, whereas subjects who were not given a future
performance expectancy should not have anticipated a second
task regardless of their performance.

Analyses revealed

that this manipulation did not have the intended impact on
subject's anticipation of a second task, X2 (1)=.05, p>.05,
or subject's lack of anticipation of a second task,

X2 (1)=.42, p>.05.

Descriptively, 68% of subjects who should
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have anticipated a second task, did so. However, nearly onethird such subjects did not believe, understand or remember
the instructions about the second task.

Most subjects who

were not given a future performance expectancy did not
expect a second task (58%); however, many such subjects did
expect a second task.

Clearly, the future performance

expectancy manipulation was not very effective.

Table 3

presents subjects' anticipation of a second task as a
function of future performance expectancy condition and
their actual performance (success or failure).
Subjects who anticipated a second task (N=97; 13 who
anticipated a second task were not in a future performance
expectancy condition) were asked if they anticipated this
task to be easier or more difficult than the first.

No

significant differences were observed as a function of
depression group, l(l,89)=.09, R>.05, future performance
expectancy, l(l,89)=.82, R>.05, or success/failure
expectancy, l(l,89)=.09, R>.05.

Subjects expected the

second task to be more difficult (M=5.95 on a 0-6 scale).
Subjects were also asked to rate their performance on
an 11-point scale.

When subjects' perceptions regarding how

well they did on the task were analyzed, a main effect of
group was observed, l(l,148)=9.146, R<.001.

Nondepressed

subjects were more likely to believe they had done very well
(M=8.43) than were depressed subjects (M=7.35), although
both groups rated their performance above average on an 11-
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Table 3
Anticipation of a Second Task as a Function of Future
Performance Expectancy and Task Performance

Task
Performance

Future Performance Expectancy

Success

No Future
Expectancy

Future
Expectancy

Anticipated
Second Task

24

47**

No Anticipation

32*

22

6

8

Failure
Anticipated
Second
No Anticipation

10*

6*

Note.

* Correct in not anticipating a second task.
** correct in anticipating a second task.
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point scale.

No other significant results were obtained for

this variable.
When subjects' perceptions regarding how their
performance compared to others' were analyzed, no
significant differences were demonstrated as a function of
-

depression, E(l,148J=.Ol, p>.05.

Depressed and nondepressed

subjects rated their performance the "same" as other
people's (M=5.58 averaged across all subjects).
success/Failure Dependent Variable
Of the total 225 subjects, 44 (19.6%) failed the
experimental task, and 181 (80.4%) succeeded.

Of the 156

consistent subjects used in the primary analyses, 30 (19.2%)
failed and 126 (80.8%) succeeded at the experimental task.
Table 4 reflects the number of subjects who succeeded and
failed in each of the eight cells.
One criterion for passing the experimental task was
that the task had to be completed in two minutes.

Subjects

demonstrated no significant differences in the amount of
time it took them to complete the experimental task,
depending on whether they were depressed or not depressed,
F(l,148)=1.05, p>.05, whether they were told to expect a
second task if they succeeded on the first task,
E(l,148)=1.64, p>.05, or whether they were told people such
as themselves tend to succeed or to fail, E(l,148)=3.0l,
p>.05.

The average task completion time across subjects was
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Table 4
Task Performance as a Function of Group, Future Performance
Expectancy and Success/Fail Expectancy CN=156)

Group

Future Performance
Expectancy

success/Failure
Expectancy
Success Expect.

Deprssd.

Fail Expect.

Future Expectancy
succeeded at Task
Failed at Task

12

18

3

3

No Future Expectancy
Succeeded at Task
Failed at Task

11

11

2

5

Nondprssd. Future Expectancy
Succeeded at Task
Failed at Task

23

17

3

5

No Future Expectancy
Succeeded at Task
Failed at Task

19

15

5

4

49
55 seconds (SD=26.80); five subjects failed the task due to
exceeding the time limit.
Chi Square analyses were used to determine if passing
or failing the task was influenced by group (depressed or
not depressed), future performance expectancy, or
success/failure expectancy.

No significant difference was

demonstrated between depressed and nondepressed subjects in
passing or failing the experimental task, X2 (1)=.04, R>.05.
Additionally, subjects who were told to expect a future task
if they succeeded at the first task did not differ in terms
of task performance compared to subjects with no future
performance expectation, X2 (1)=.77, R>.05.

These results

held for both depressed (X2 (1)=.14, R>.05) and nondepressed

(X2 (1)=.53, R>.05) subjects.

Thus, the current research did

not replicate the strategic failure findings of Weary and
Williams (1990).
Subjects who were told that people such as themselves
(i.e., depressed or not depressed) were expected to fail did
not differ in their rates of passing or failing compared to
subjects who were told people such as themselves were
expected to succeed,

X2 (1)=.66, R>.05.

Furthermore, there

was no success/failure expectancy by group interaction, as
was predicted based on previous evidence of selfverif ication by depressives.

Thus, subjects' failure or

success at the task was not associated with a desire to
verify their perceptions of themselves as depressed or not

so

depressed.

These results fail to replicate the findings of

Swann and his associates (Swann et al., 1981, 1984, 1992)
regarding self-verification among depressives.
Given that future performance expectancy and
success/failure expectancy had not been covaried previously,
it was of interest to examine whether these variables
interacted to determine success or failure on the task.
Subject success was not influenced by manipulating
success/failure expectancies with future performance
expectancies,

X2 (1)=.16, R>.05, nor was subject failure,

X2 (1)=.002, R>.05.

Further, no difference in task success

was found as a function of future performance expectancy,
success/failure expectancy, and depression group; for
depressives, X2 (1)=.Sl, R>.05 and for nondepressives,

X2 (1)=.02, R>.05.

No difference in task failure was

observed as a function of these variables, either; for
depressives,

X2 (1)=.63, R>.05 and for nondepressives,

X2 (1)=.SS, R>.05.
Additional analyses assessed whether BDI depression
status alone (i.e., depressed or nondepressed, regardless of
subjects• perception of their depressive status), and
subjects' perception of their depressed status alone
(regardless of BDI depression status), had an impact on
subject task performance.

All 225 subjects were included in

these analyses, as subject consistency in terms of BDI and
perceived depression status was not a factor.

No
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differences in task performance were observed depending on
BDI depression status,

X2 (1)=.14, R>.05.

Subject

performance did not differ depending on future performance
expectancy for subjects who were BDI depressed (X2 (1)=.07,
R>.05) or for those who were not (X2 (1)=1.97, R>.05).
Similarly, no differences in performance were demonstrated
depending on success/failure expectancy for subjects who
were BDI depressed (X2 (1)=.65, R>.05) or for those who were
not (X2 (1)=1.50, R>.05).

Further, no differences in task

performance were observed as a function of subjects• selfperceived depression status (X2 (1)=.21, R>.05), future
performance expectancy (X2 (1)=2.33, R>.05 and

x2 (1)=.06,

R>.05 for perceived depressives and nondepressives,
respectively), or success/failure expectancy (X2 (1)=2.8,
R>.05 and

X2 (1)=1.10, R>.05 for perceived depressives and

nondepressives, respectively).
The fact that most subjects were consistent in terms
of corresponding BDI and DPI scores precluded analysis of
task performance based on a factorial combination of
depression group (depressed or not depressed) and
depression-proneness, due to insufficient numbers of
inconsistent subjects.

This analysis was intended to

determine 1) if individuals prone to depression but not
currently depressed were more likely to succeed or to fail,
and 2) would individuals who were not depression-prone but
were depressed be more likely to succeed or to fail.
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Descriptively, however, an even split was obtained; half of
the 30 subjects who failed were depression-prone and half
were not.

Of those subjects who were both depressed and

depression-prone, 44 succeeded while 12 failed.

Of those

subjects who were neither depressed nor depression-prone, 53
succeeded while 14 failed.

Among subjects who were not

depressed but are depression-prone, 21 succeeded and three
failed.

Among subjects who were depressed but not

depression-prone, eight succeeded and one failed.

Thus,

these findings suggest that success/failure rates were not a
function of depression proneness.
Feedback Choice
Subjects were also asked to indicate what type of
feedback, positive or negative, they would choose if they
could select only one type.
was no effect of Group,

Contrary to predictions, there

X2 (1)=2.32, R>.05, with 66.7% of

subjects choosing positive feedback.

Also, no difference in

feedback choice was found as a function of future
performance expectancy,
expectancy,

X2 (1)=.0l, R>.05, or success/failure

X2 (1)=.48, R>.05.

Finally, no differences in

feedback choice were observed as a function of passing or
failing the experimental task,

X2 (1)=2.13, R>.05.

Descriptively, however, 69.4% of subjects who succeeded
chose positive feedback, while 55.2% of subjects who failed
chose positive feedback.
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Subjects were also asked how important partner
feedback was to them.

No statistically significant effects

of Group, Future Performance Expectancy, or Success/Failure
Expectancy were observed.

These findings also failed to

replicate those of Swann and his colleagues (Swann et al.,
1981, 1989, 1992) regarding choice of self-verifying
feedback by people with depressed and nondepressed selfconcepts.
Perception of Performance
A significant difference was demonstrated between
subjects' perception of their performance on the task and
their actual performance.

Two-thirds of subjects who failed

the experimental task believed they succeeded, X2 (1)=30.12,
p<.0001.

Among subjects who failed the task, there was a

significant difference in perception of performance between
subjects who were depressed versus those who were not
depressed,

X2 (1)=8.21, p<.005.

Of the 17 nondepressed

subjects who actually failed the task, two believed they
failed, while 15 believed they succeeded.

Of· the 13

depressed subjects who failed the experimental task, eight
believed they failed while five believed they succeeded.
Thus, depressed subjects were more likely to be aware of and
admit their failure than were nondepressives.
In contrast, there was no difference in perception of
performance between depressed and nondepressed subjects who
succeeded at the task,

X2 (1)=.09, p>.05.

Of the 73
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nondepressed subjects who succeeded at the task, 71 believed
they succeeded and two believed they failed.

Of the 52

depressed subjects who succeeded, 51 believed they succeeded
and one believed she or he failed.
In sum, Weary and Williams (1990) and Swann et al.
(1992) were not replicated if one examines actual success or
failure at the interpersonal task.

This may be explained,

in part, by the fact that subjects incorrectly perceived
their performance.

Unfortunately, the very low numbers of

subjects (N=lO, eight depressed and two nondepressed) who
were correct about their failure prohibits an analysis of
"correct" success/failure as a function of future
performance and success/failure expectancies.

Table 5 shows

the breakdown of subjects in each experimental condition who
accurately reported whether they succeeded or failed.
Transient Mood states as a Function of the Task
Subjects' scores on the MAACL were analyzed both prior
to and following the experimental manipulation to determine
if there were mood changes for depressed and nondepressed
subjects as a function of future performance expectancy and
success/failure expectancy conditions.

These analyses were

carried out both to determine whether subjects were
comparable with regard to affective state prior to the
experimental manipulation (MAACL Timel), and to determine
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Table 5
Subjects in Each Condition with an
Accurate Perception of Their Task Performance CN=l32l

Group

Future Performance
Expectancy

Success/Failure
Expectancy
Success Expect.

Fail Expect.

Future Expectancy
Accurate success

12

18

Accurate Failure

1

3

Accurate Success

10

11

Accurate Failure

1

3

Accurate Success

23

15

Accurate Failure

0

0

Depressed
No Future Expectancy

Future Expectancy

No Future Expectancy
Accurate success

18

15

Accurate Failure

1

1
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the possible impact of the experimental manipulation on
subjects' affect (MAACL Timel and MAACL Time2).

It might be

noted that subjects in the current study on average
demonstrated MAACL scores comparable to the normative sample
means (Zuckerman·& Lubin, 1965) for anxiety (M=50.66),
depression (M=46.97) and hostility (M=47.88).
Subjects' anxiety, depression, and hostility MAACL
scores at Timel (prior to the task manipulation) were
analyzed using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with mood scores
as the dependent variable and group, future performance
expectancy, and success/failure expectancy as independent
variables.

It should be noted that Multivariate Analysis of

Variance with mood scores as the repeated measure would be
inappropriate, as the mood subscales are not comparable due
to differences in scale construction and scoring.

Thus, the

three mood states cannot be compared directly with each
other, but can be used to demonstrate differences in mood
between groups and over time.
Analysis of anxiety at Timel yielded a main effect of
Group, F(l,148)=116.03, R<.001, with depressed subjects
initially more anxious than nondepressed subjects.

Analysis

of depression at Timel yielded a main effect of group,
E(l,148)=87.99, R<.001, with depressed subjects reporting
more depressed affect than nondepressed subjects.

Analysis

of hostility at Timel yielded a main effect of group,
E(l,148)=42.40, R<.001, as depressed subjects reported more
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hostility.

No other main effects or interactions involving

future performance and success/failure expectancies were
observed for MAACL Timel scores, reflecting that subjects
were evenly distributed across these conditions with regard
to mood scores.

Means for MAACL subscales as a function of

group are presented in Table 6.
For anxiety MAACL scores, a MANOVA with time as the
repeated variable revealed a between-subjects main effect
for group, E(l,147)=119.05, R<.0005, and a within-subject
main effect of time, E(l,147)=9.53, R<.005.

Collapsed

across Timel and Time2, depressed subjects were more anxious
than nondepressed subjects (M=59.66 and M=42.84,
respectively).

Subjects across conditions were more anxious

at Timel (pre-task; M=52.10) than at Time2 (M=50.40).
Similarly, for depression MAACL scores, main effects
were demonstrated for group, E(l,147)=74.80, R<.0005, and
for time, E(l,147)=5.04, R<.03.

Depressed subjects reported

more depressed mood (M=54.14) than did nondepressed subjects
(M=40.95).

Subjects reported more depressed mood at Timel

(M=48.05) than at Time2 (M=47.04).

A group by future

performance expectancy by time interaction also occurred,
E(l,147)=4.17, R<.05 (see Table 7).

Nondepressed subjects

who had no future performance expectancy reported less
depressed mood at Time2,
depressed subjects who

~(42)=2.09,

~

R<.05; in contrast,

given a future performance

expectancy reported significantly less depressed
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Table 6
Mean Timel and Mean Time2 Mood Scores
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses.)
Mean Timel Mood Scores
Anxiety

Depression

Hostility

Depressed
N=65

60.62
(10.98)

55.25
(10.56)

54.89
(12.83)

Nondepressed
N=91

43.55
(8.45)

41.05
(7. 87)

42.88
(9. 50)

Group

Mean Time2 Mood Scores
Anxiety

Depression

Hostility

Depressed
N=65

58.69
(12.42)

53.23
(12.03)

52.84
(13.11)

Nondepressed
N=91

42.12
(7.87)

40.85
(8.14)

42.60
(8.82)

Group
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Table 7
Deoressed Mood at Timel and Time2 as a Function of
Group and Future Performance Expectancy
(Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Timel Depression Means
Future Expectancy

No Future Expectancy

Group
Depressed

56.85
(10.06)

52.66
{10.90)

Nondepressed

41.87
(8.21)

40.35
(7. 56)

Time2 Depression Means
Future Expectancy

No Future Expectancy

Group
Depressed

53.80
(10.56)

52.16
(13.42)

Nondepressed

42.18
(8.50)

39.40
(7.64)
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mood at Time2,

~{34)=2.81,

R<.01.

No other effects were

observed.
For hostility MAACL scores, main effects were obtained
for group,

~{l,147)=38.51,

~(1,147)=7.51,

hostile mood

R<.01.

(M=53.~2)

R<.0005, and for time,

Depressed subjects reported more
than did nondepressives (M=42.74),

collapsed across Timel and Time2.

Subjects reported more

hostile mood across conditions at Timel {M=48.84) relative
to Time2 (M=47.72).
The small number of subjects who failed the task
precluded analysis of differences in MAACL mood scores at
Timel and Time2 based on task success or failure.

One way

to examine this, however, was to exclude from the analyses
those subjects who failed the task and note any changes in
the pattern of mood scores.

In general, results of these

analyses replicated the mood effects that were observed for
all subjects combined (i.e., both those who failed and those
who succeeded), and negative mood scores for subjects who
succeeded did not decrease appreciably from the sample
consisting of all subjects combined.
In sum, depressed subjects reported more anxiety,
depression and hostility than did nondepressed subjects
across all conditions.

Both depressed and nondepressed

subjects reported lower levels of negative affect following
completion of the task.

Finally, nondepressed subjects who

were not given a future performance expectancy reported
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significantly less depressed mood post-task; depressed
subjects who were given a future performance expectancy
reported significantly less depressed mood post-task.
Attributions Regarding Task Performance
Analyses of subjects' attributions regarding their
performance were

c~rried

out to determine if there were

differences as a function of group, future performance
expectancy, and success/failure expectancy.
The first question assessed subjects• perception of
task importance following the task, using an 11-point scale,
with o being not at all important and 10 being very
important.

(Recall that no differences in importance were

demonstrated before task performance.]

A MANOVA analyzing

importance of the task pre- and post-task completion yielded
main effects of success/failure expectancy, E(l,143)=6.12,
R<.02 and time, E(l,143)=4.83, R<.05.

The task was deemed

more important by subjects who had been told people such as
themselves fail (H=6.65) than by those who were told people
such as themselves succeed (H=5.71), and more important by
subjects across all conditions after completion (M=6.31)
than before (H=6.08).

A group by time interaction was

obtained, E(l,143)=4.63, R<.05.

Depressed subjects rated

performance on the task as more important after completing
the task (H=6.83) than they had previously (H=6.37),
-3.07, R<.005.

~(62)=

Nondepressives• ratings did not vary with

time (H=5.89 both pre- and post-task),

~(87)=.005,

R>.05.
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An interaction between success/failure expectancy and time
was also obtained, l{l,143)=4.77, R<.05.

Subjects who had

been told people such as themselves fail the task rated the
task as more important post-task completion {H=6.84) than
they had previously {H=6.45),

~{75)=-2.77,

R<.01.

The

ratings of people who had been given a success expectancy
did not vary with time, with means of 5.72 and 5.71 pre- and
post-task, respectively,

~{74)=.ll,

R>.05.

Subjects also were asked to rate the extent to which
their success or failure was due to effort, their innate
ability, their ability to succeed at word games/tasks, and
luck.

For each of these attributions, there were no effects

of group, future performance expectancy, or success/failure
expectancy, with all significance levels greater than .05.
In general, subjects attributed their performance to their
own effort {H=6.22 on a 0-10 scale), their innate ability
{H=6.31 on a 0-10 scale), their ability at succeeding with

word games/tasks {H=S.15 on a 0-10 scale), and did not
attribute their performance to luck {H=2.24 on a 0-10
scale).
Subjects also rated the extent to which they believed
their success or failure on the task was under their
control.

A main effect for group was obtained,

l{l,148)=5.401, R<.05, as nondepressed subjects believed

they had more control over the task outcome than did
depressed subjects {H=S.63 and H=7.83, respectively)",
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although subjects in both groups judged their degree of
control to be high.
A main effect for group was demonstrated for subjects'
attributions regarding the influence of their task partner
on their performance, E(1,147)=4.83, R<.05.

Depressed

subjects indicated their partners had more influence (M=2.09
on a 0-10 scale) on their performance than did nondepressed
subjects (M=l.21); clearly, however, both groups reported
the partner had little influence on performance.
Additionally, a trend for an interaction between group and
success/failure expectancy occurred for the partner
influence variable, E(l,147)=3.74, R<.06. Depressed subjects
who had been told that depressed people fail the task tended
to rate their task partners as slightly more influential
(M=2.59) than depressed subjects who had been told that
depressives succeed on the task (M=l.43), t(63)=1.68, R<.10.
In contrast, there was almost no difference between the
ratings of nondepressed subjects who had been told that
nondepressives succeed (M=l.37) versus those who had been
told nondepressive fail CM=l.02), t(BB)=-.78, R>.05.
Subjects who indicated that their partner influenced
their performance (H=64) were asked to rate the degree to
which this influence was positive or negative.

A trend was

observed for depressed subjects to rate this influence as
more negative (M=5.27) than did nondepressed subjects
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(M=6.24),

~(1,56)=2.89,

R<.10, although both groups' ratings

were fairly neutral.
Subjects were also asked to rate the extent to which
they attributed their success or failure to something
internal (e.g., ability, effort) or something external to
them (e.g., other people or luck).

No significant effects

were obtained for the group, future performance expectancy,
and success/failure expectancy variables.

Both depressed

and nondepressed subjects tended to attribute their
performance to internal factors (M=2.34 on a 1-6 scale
ranging from "internal" to "external").
Subjects were asked if the cause of their success or
failure would be present in the future.

There were no

effects of group, future performance expectancy, or
success/failure expectancy, with subjects indicating the
cause is likely to almost always be present (M=4.74 on a 1-6
scale).
Subjects were also asked if the cause of their success
or failure on the experimental task would influence other
life areas.

A two-way interaction occurred between the

future performance expectancy and success/failure expectancy
conditions,

~(1,146)=4.32,

R<.05. Subjects who were given a

success expectancy did not report that the cause of their
success or failure would influence other life areas,
regardless of future performance expectancy,
R>.05.

~(74)=-.31,

Subjects who were given a failure expectancy,
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however, were more likely to believe the cause of their
success or failure would be influential in other life areas
if they were not given a future performance expectancy than
if they were,

~(76)=2.66,

R<.05 (see Table 8).

No other

main effects or interactions were observed.
In sum, subjects in general attributed more importance
to performing well on the task after completing it than
before, and also rated performance to be more important if
they were told people such as themselves fail.

Depressed

subjects and subjects who were given a failure expectancy
tended to attribute more importance to the task after its
completion than they had prior to engaging in the task.
Subjects tended to make internal attributions (e.g., effort,
ability) for their performance rather than external
attributions (e.g., luck, influence of task partner).
Nondepressed subjects believed they had more control over
task outcome than did depressives, although both groups
believed they had considerable control over their own
performance.

Finally, subjects were more likely to report

that the cause for their success or failure would influence
other life areas if they were told people such as themselves
fail and they were not given a future performance
expectancy.
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Table 8
Mean Ratings for the Influence of cause of Success/Failure
on Other Life Areas as a Function of Future Performance
Expectancy and Success/Failure Expectancy

success/Failure
Expectancy

Future Performance
Expectancy
Future Expect.

Success
Expectancy

Failure
Expectancy

No Future Expect.

4.75
(N=40)

4.64
(N=36)

4.28
(N=43)

5.14
(N=35)
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Anxiety, Strategic Failure and Self-Verification
Weary and Williams (1990) noted that while their
theory of strategic failure is based on depressives, it had
not been determined to what extent the protective selfpresentation strategy proposed by Hill et al. (1986) and
supported by their findings "is related to depression,
anxiety, or psychopathology in general" (p. 897).

Indeed,

Baumgardner and Brownlee (1987) demonstrated evidence of
strategic failure with socially anxious subjects.

Further,

research into self-verification has not assessed subjects'
anxiety levels prior to experimental manipulation.

Swann,

Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992) did find that when
subjects with positive or negative self-concepts were given
unfavorable feedback, both groups of subjects reported
anxious as well as depressed mood in response to such
feedback.

Thus, the question of what mood characteristics

underlie strategic failure and self-verification phenomena
remained.
To address this question, the current study assessed
subjects' state and trait anxiety in addition to their
depressive status.

Of the 156 subjects used in the primary

analyses, 81 scored at or above the median for state anxiety
(Md=48) and were included in the "anxious state" group, and
78 scored at or above the median for trait anxiety (Md=49)
and were included in the "anxious traits" group (not to be
confused with the depressed/not depressed groups used in the
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primary analyses}.

These groups were formed to determine if

anxiety interacts with the independent variable of future
performance expectancy to impact performance on the task,
and if so, if the impact of anxiety is the same or different
than any impact of depression. It might be noted that the
sample in the current study on average scored one standard
deviation above the normative sample means (Spielberger, et
al., 1983} for both state (H=49.75} and trait (H=50.37}
anxiety.
A high positive correlation was obtained for state and
trait anxiety scores

(~=.71,

R<.01}, reflecting that

subjects who were in an anxious state also possess more
anxious traits than subjects who were not in an anxious
state.

As mentioned previously, high positive correlations

were also obtained between BDI scores and state anxiety
(~=.76,

R<.01} and trait anxiety

(~=.77,

R<.01}, reflecting

a relationship between the measurement of anxious and
depressive symptoms.
Subjects' scores for state and trait anxiety were used
to determine if passing or failing the task was related to
anxiety.

Subjects demonstrated no difference in task

performance depending on whether they were in an anxious
state or not, X2 (1)=.03, R>.05, or whether they possess
anxious traits or not,

X2 (1}=.66, R>.05.

Subjects' scores

for state and trait anxiety were analyzed by group (anxious
or not anxious} and future performance expectancy (the
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strategic failure manipulation).

Subjects in an anxious

state did not fail strategically, X2 (1)=2.27, R>.05.
Subjects who professed to possessing anxious traits did not
fail strategically either; oddly, such subjects were more
likely to fail if they were not given a future performance
expectancy than if they were, X2 (1)=3.94, R<.05.

Of those

subjects with anxious traits and no future performance
expectancy, 11 failed while 23 succeeded; of those subjects
with anxious traits who did have a future performance
expectancy, six failed and 38 succeeded.
Would anxious subjects, like depressed subjects in
Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham's (1992) research, choose
negative feedback from an evaluator?

To determine if

anxious subjects would attempt to self-verify negative
attributes by requesting negative feedback from their task
partner, subjects• choice of partner feedback was analyzed
by group (anxious or not).

Those in an anxious state

expressed no preference for negative feedback over positive
feedback, X2 (1)=.16, R>.05, nor did subjects with anxious
traits,

X2 (1)=.06, R>.05.

Thus, anxious subjects did not

attempt to self-verify negative traits.
Given the findings reported above, the current
research did not demonstrate evidence of strategic failure
or self-verification among anxious subjects.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Strategic Failure
The findings of the current research do not support
Weary and Williams' (1990) hypothesis that depressed
individuals strategically fail in order to decrease future
performance demands.

Depressed individuals did not differ

from nondepressed subjects in their performance on the
interpersonal task.

The lack of significant findings are

not due to a lower level of depression in the current study
relative to Weary and Williams' (1990) study.

In their

study, the "depressed" subjects consisted mostly of mildly
depressed/dysphoric individuals who scored between 10-15 on
the BDI.

Rather, it is proposed that the current findings

fail to demonstrate strategic failure by depressives because
depressives do not consciously fail in order to decrease
future performance demands.

In the current study, as well

as in Weary and Williams (1990) research, depressives
reported a conscious belief that they had done at least as
well as any other subject.
Williams'

It may be that Weary and

(1990) depressives/dysphorics strategically

failed, but it cannot be said that they did so consciously.
Several additional factors may contribute to the
contrasting results of the current research when compared to
70
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Weary and Williams (1990) findings.

First, this study, in

contrast with the Weary and Williams (1990) study, utilized
an actual interpersonal task rather than a visual-motor
skill task.

It may be that the involvement of a task

partner mediated whatever strategic failure tendencies
subjects may have possessed, such that subjects succeeded
for the benefit of the partner rather than failing, as Weary
and Williams hypothesize, for their own benefit.

In

addition, the fact that the task partner was a peer of the
subjects' may also be a factor, in that a peer's opinion
might have been more highly valued by subjects than that of
the experimenter.
Secondly, subjects may have been more interested and
invested in the word task utilized in the current research
than they were by the rote monotony of the Weary and
Williams (1990) visual-motor skill task (pushing colored
pins into a corkboard).

certainly, word recognition and

facility are domains that are more highly valued by most
college students than are color recognition and motor
skills.

Therefore, failure on an interpersonal word-sorting

task would be less desirable than failure on a visual-motor
skill task.

Even the expectation that the second word task

would be more difficult than the first did not cause
subjects to fail in order to get out of the second task.
Finally, it was observed that 32% of subjects who
should have anticipated a second task, based on the ·future
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performance expectancy information they had been given and
their successful performance on the first task, did not
expect a second task.

While experimental subject pool

participants are typically wary rather than naive regarding
statements from experimenters, this wariness is likely to be
only a partial explanation of this finding.

It is possible

that the current study failed to demonstrate evidence of
strategic failure, at least in part, because the future
expectancy manipulation was not effective for nearly onethird of the subjects in that condition.
Beyond the failure of the current study to replicate
Weary and Williams' (1990) findings, however, exist more
fundamental concerns regarding the very premise of the
strategic failure hypothesis as it relates to depressives.
First, it is not clear, despite Weary and Williams• (1990)
arguments to the contrary, that strategic failure is
different from self-handicapping.

These authors state that

strategic failure goes beyond self-handicapping because
people who failed strategically did not attribute their
performance to any sort of "handicap."

They fail to note,

however, that Shepperd and Arkin's (1989) self-handicappers
did not make such attributions, either.

Rather, Shepperd

and Arkin (1989) inferred that high public self-conscious
subjects were handicapping through their choice of
performance-inhibiting music; the subjects did not make this
observation themselves.

Essentially, this choice of
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performance-inhibiting music is no different than Weary and
Williams' {1990) subjects hindering their own performance by
taking too long to complete the task.

Further, and more

problematic, is that Weary and Williams {1990) have proposed
a theory of depressive attributions for strategic failure
that contradicts accepted theory regarding depressive
attributions.

Weary and Williams {1990) propose that

depressive strategic failure is different from selfhandicapping because depressives fail and they do not make
any attributions (such as task difficulty) to excuse their
failure.

As mentioned previously, depressives tend to

attribute poor performance to internal causes and successful
performance to external causes (Abramson et al., 1978;
Seligman et al., 1979).

To expect otherwise, and to then

build a theory around the failure to observe one's
expectations, is akin to expecting a leopard to shed its
spots and then building a theory of leopard strategic
failure when it does not do so.
Self-Verification
Depressed individuals also were not motivated to
self-verify their depressed status, either by responding to
the task in the way they were told depressed people do, or
by choosing negative feedback from their task partner.
A possible reason for this failure to support the
self-verification theory of Swann and his associates {1981,
1984, 1989, 1992) is that the majority of "depressed"
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subjects in the current study were only mildly to moderately
depressed.

Only two subjects were classified as severely

depressed by the BDI criteria.

Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull and

Pelham (1992) note that while mildly depressed subjects will
on occasion seek out negative/self-verifying feedback, they
do not do so

consi~tently.

Another factor contributing to the failure to support
self-verification theory may be that both depressed and
nondepressed subjects believed they possess a high level of
ability at word tasks and games.

Swann et al. (1989) state

that while subjects with low self-esteem choose unfavorable
feedback related to negative self-views, they also choose
favorable feedback related to positive attributes.

Swann,

Wenzlaff, Krull and Pelham (1992) found that people strive
to verify only firmly held negative self-views; unless one's
self-concept is extremely negative, self-enhancement
strivings may mute or even supersede self-verification
strivings.

Thus, the subjects involved in the current

research may have been more inclined to self-enhance their
positive attributes (e.g., skill at word tasks) by
succeeding and choosing favorable feedback rather than selfverifying negative attributes.
Further, a larger problem exists with selfverification research in general (Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, &
Pelham, 1992; Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi, 1992).
frequently, self-verification researchers have made

Too
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unwarranted assumptions regarding subjects' selfconceptions; assumptions upon which their conclusions are
based.

For example, Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham (1992}

assumed that subjects with relatively low scores on a
measure of sociability also had low self-concepts, and that
subjects high in sqciability had high self-concepts.
Clearly, such an assumption is not justified without
supporting data regarding subjects• global self-conceptions.
In addition, Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi (1992} assumed, as
part of their experimental manipulation, that favorable
feedback (ostensibly based on an interview of the subject}
was incongruent for dysphorics and unfavorable feedback was
incongruent for nondysphorics, without any tests of those
assumptions.
The current study avoided the problems discussed above
by basing experimental manipulations on subjects'
perceptions of themselves.

This also ensured that the

current study tested self-verification (i.e., attempts to
verify one's own self-perception} and not behavioral
confirmation (i.e., adaptations of one's behaviors to
confirm the opinions of others}.

The experimenter did not

tell subjects how they were expected to behave, and subjects
were not aware that the experimenter had read the
questionnaire revealing the subjects• self-perceived
depression status.

Thus, the absence of self-verification

in the present study may be due to the fact that a more
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direct assessment of subject self-perception was used.

This

suggests that previous findings in support of selfverif ication may be artifacts of the assumptions made by
investigators regarding subjects' self-perceptions.

Future

research might evaluate subjects' perceptions even further.
In addition to ascertaining whether subjects perceive
themselves as depressed or not, as was done in the current
study, subjects could also be asked if they tend to fail or
tend to succeed, and if people who are depressed tend to
fail or to succeed and if people who are not depressed tend
to fail or to succeed.
Additionally, Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull and Pelham (1992)
assert that depressives actively, but unconsciously, engage
in self-verifying behaviors.

While this may be true, it is

an entirely speculative assertion at this time.

These

authors did not address directly the conscious or
unconscious nature of self-verification in any of their
studies.

While empirical demonstration of unconscious

motives is a classically difficult undertaking, certainly it
should at least be attempted prior to offering statements
regarding such motives.
Finally, Swann and his colleagues have yet to attempt
to test one of their most fundamental assertions.

They have

not demonstrated that self-verification is motivated by "a
desire to bolster perceptions of existential security and
interpersonal control" (Swann et al., 1992, p. 304);

Until
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it is determined whether this is actually the case, it is
not clear if self-verification really does differ from
consistency theory.
Perception of Performance
Perhaps the most interesting results of this research
have to do with subjects' perceptions of their performance.
First, two-thirds of the people who failed the task believed
that they succeeded, despite their task partners' pointing
out the correct word pairings following the subjects'
mismatching of pairs.

Second, while almost all subjects

accurately perceived when they succeeded, and depressed
subjects also accurately perceived when they failed,
nondepressed subjects tended to perceive task failure as
success.

The inaccurate nondepressed subjects comprise the

majority of subjects who failed and believed they succeeded.
What is to be made of these findings?

The phrase

"sadder but wiser" springs to mind (Alloy & Abramson, 1979).
Perhaps the depressed and dysphoric subjects experienced
depressed mood partly as a function of possessing realistic
perceptions of their limitations and failings.

In contrast,

perhaps the nondepressed subjects are not depressed due to
their lack of awareness, and even denial, of at least some
of their limitations and failings.
Depressive realism literature (see Alloy and Abramson,
1988 for a review) supports the idea that depressed subjects
tend to be more balanced and even more realistic in·
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processing self-relevant information.

Nondepressives, in

contrast, demonstrate self-enhancing biases in their selfrelevant perceptions.

While depressives seem to be more

realistic according to this perspective, their perceptions
may not be more adaptive.

Indeed, Alloy and Abramson (1988,

citing Tiger, 1979) inquire whether nondepressive optimism
is more pervasive than depressive realism due to an
evolutionary process of natural selection. These authors
state that the optimistic, self-enhancing biases of
nondepressives protect them against threats to self-esteem,
allow them to maintain expectations of success (which leads
to increased behavioral persistence and therefore greater
likelihood of success), and help them to deal with stress.
From this point of view, it is better to be wrong than
right.

Alloy and Abramson (1988) state, "Maladaptive

symptoms of depression, such as low self-esteem, social
skills deficits, negative affect, decreased persistence,
poor coping with stress, and suicidal thoughts and attempts,
may be consequences, in part, of the absence of healthy
personal illusions" (p. 257).
Transient Mood as a Function of Task Performance
Other investigators have found that when depressed
persons appear to fail strategically (Weary & Williams,
1990) and self-verify (Swann, et al., 1987; Swann, Wenzlaff,
Krull, & Pelham, 1992), they experience increased emotional
discomfort.

In the current research, however, depressed
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subjects neither strategically failed nor self-verified, and
they reported less negative mood after completing the task,
across all conditions.

It seems that simply completing the

performance demand led to a decrease in negative mood.
As mentioned above, Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham
(1992) and Swann, et al., (1987) claimed that selfverification is associated with painful affect.

These

authors stated that people with negative self-concepts chose
unfavorable feedback despite the fact that such feedback
elicited a painful affective state.

Unfortunately, these

authors did not actually investigate if choice of negative
feedback elicits negative affect as they claimed it does,
because subjects• affect was not assessed after they made
their feedback choice.

Rather, the authors assumed subject

affect was negative due to their earlier findings that
revealed giving people unsolicited negative feedback led to
depressed and anxious mood.

Further complicating matters is

the fact that subject mood was not assessed prior to the
experimental manipulation in their study, thereby preventing
a true measure of the impact of unfavorable feedback.
In the present study, subject mood was assessed both
before and after subjects were given an opportunity to
strategically fail and/or self-verify, thus improving upon
past research that investigated the effect of selfver if ication on affect.

The small number of subjects who

failed in the current study precluded analysis of change in
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affect due to task performance.

Descriptively, however,

subjects who succeeded reported less negative affect than
did subjects in general, although these differences were
negligible.

Future research may seek to assess affect yet a

third time, following subject choice of partner feedback.
Shift in Task Importance
Prior to meeting their task partner and engaging in
the task, depressed and nondepressed subjects did not differ
in their ratings of how important it was to do well on the
task.

Both groups indicated that it was somewhat important

to do well.

Following completion of the task, however,

depressed subjects indicated it was significantly more
important for them to do well than did nondepressed
subjects.

It may be that depressives were protecting

themselves prior to completing the task by minimizing how
important it was to them to do well.

While not ideal, this

may be a more adaptive form of emotional protection than
self-handicapping or failing strategically, which was not
observed.

Post-task, depressed subjects may have been

engaging in some savoring and embellishment of the
importance of their accomplishment; an accomplishment that
appears to have been more meaningful to them than to
nondepressives.
Also, subjects who had been told people such as
themselves fail the task stated it was more important for
them to do well than did subjects who were told people such
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as themselves succeed.

These subjects may have valued more

highly that which was accomplished "against all odds."
Having been told they were expected to fail the task,
successful performance increased in importance.
Implications for Future Research
The current research suggests several areas of future
study of strategic failure and self-verification.

First, no

published study other than Weary and Williams' (1990) has
demonstrated evidence of strategic failure by depressives.
The current research calls into question the legitimacy of
the strategic failure hypothesis as it applies to
depressives, particularly the notion that depressives would
attribute poor performance to external factors, and the
claim that "strategic" implies conscious failure when the
data do not support this assertion.

Further, and more

fundamentally, it has not yet been demonstrated that
strategic failure is actually any different than selfhandicapping.

Clearly, more research into the strategic

failure hypothesis is indicated.
Second, research on both theories has yet to be
carried out with significant numbers of truly clinically
depressed subjects.

It still remains to be seen, as Alloy

and Lipman (1992) and Hooley and Richters (1992) point out,
whether depressives' self-verification of negative
attributes or their failure to self-enhance to the extent
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that nondepressives do is responsible for the development
and maintenance of clinical depression.
Finally, future research into self-verification
requires thoughtful attention to several problems with past
research mentioned earlier, including the assumption that
self-verification differs from consistency theory, the
assumption that self-verification is an unconscious process,
faulty group classification criteria, assumptions made
regarding depressives and nondepressives that may conflict
with their actual self-conceptions, and lack of adequate
assessment of the impact of self-verification strivings on
affect.

Appendix
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CONSENT FORM
In this study, you will be asked to fill out several
questionnaires. You will also work with another student to
complete a task. The study will take no longer than one hour,
and you will receive credit to apply to your experiment
requirement.
All of the information that we collect from you today is
confidential. This means that it will be seen only by myself
and qualified researchers, and will be used for research
purposes only. Your individual results will not be shared with
your professor, your classmates, or anvone not directly
involved in this research. Further, the information is
anonymous. Your name will not appear on any of the data we
collect.
If you should decide at any point to discontinue your
participation in this project, for whatever reason, feel free
to do so. Though I do not expect that this will happen, I want
you to know that you may discontinue your participation
without incurring a penalty of any kind.
At the end of the study, you will be told the purpose and
hypotheses of the study in detail. Any questions you may have
about the procedure will be answered.
This study is being conducted under the auspices of Dr.
Jeanne Albright of the Psychology Department of Loyola
University, and has the approval of the Loyola University
Institutional Review Board.
Again, thank you for your participation. You are making
a valuable contribution to this research.
Sincerely,

Julia Anable

I HAVE READ THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND IT.

Signature

Date
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I.D.#

Which of the following best describes you and how you have
felt in the past week, including today? Please circle one.
a. severely depressed
b. moderately depressed
c. mildly depressed
d. not depressed
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DPI Scale
Directions: When responding to the questions on this scale,
please try to answer according to how you think, feel, and
react in general. For each question, circle the number that
describes you best.
1. Are you the type of person who easily becomes very
depressed, sad, blue, or down in the dumps?
I never
become
depressed

3

I become
depressed
very easily

7

6

5

4

2. on the average, how often do you feel very depressed,
sad, blue, or down in the dumps? (Circle the number that
best describes you.)
1
3
s
7

2
4
6

Never
Once per year
Three times per year
six or more times per year

Less than once per year
Twice per year
Four or five times per
year

3. Would your parent rate you as a person who easily
becomes very depressed, sad, blue, or down in the dumps?
Parents would
say I never 1
2
become depressed

4

3

5

7

6

Parents would
say I become
depressed very
easily

4. Would your friends who know you rate you as a person who
easily becomes very depressed, sad, blue, or down in the
dumps?
Friends would
say I never
1
become depressed

5

4

3

2

6

7

Friends would
say I become
depressed very
easily

s. on the whole, would you rate yourself as a person who is
vulnerable (susceptible) or invulnerable (resistant) to
depression.
Extremely
invulnerable
(resistent)
to depression

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Extremely
vulnerable
(susceptible)
to depression
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6. Are you the type of person who tends to qive up easily
or who keeps tryinq when confronted with a difficult task?
Almost always
keeps tryinq

1

2

..

3

Almost always
qives up

7

5

7. Are you the type of person who feels inadequate or who
feels confident when confronted with a neqative event in
your life?
Feels extremely
confident
1

2

..

3

5

7

Feels extremely
inadequate

8. Are you the type of person who tends to view your future
in a neqative way or a positive way?
Extremely
positive way

1

2

3

..

5

6

7

Extremely
neqative way

9. If you and a qroup of 6 of your friends were confronted
with the same neqative life event, who would become more
depressed
you or your friends?
1
2

3
4
5
6
7

All of my friends would become more depressed than me.
5/6 of my friends would become more depressed than me.
4/6 of my friends would become more depressed than me.
3/6 of my friends would become more depressed than me.
2/6 of my friends would become more depressed than me.
1/6 of my friends would become more depressed than me.
I would become more depressed than all of my friends.

10. Do you typically see events in a more neqative liqht
than other people see them?
I always see events more
positively than other people
see them
2
1
3

..

I always see events more
neqatively than other people
see them
5
6
7
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ID #
PRE-MC

Please rate how important it is for you to do well on this
task:
0

1

2

5

3

7

6

8

not at all
important

9

10

very
important

Please rate how much experience you have with this type of
task:
0

1

2

no experience
at all

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

a lot of
experience
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I.D. f
PostPKC
1. Did you anticipate, based on what the experimenter told
you before you began the task and your performance on the
task, that you would do a second task? Circle one:
yes
no
If yes, please rate how easy or difficult you expected
the second task to be compared to the first task.

2.

0----1----2----3----4----s----1----1----a----9----10

much
easier
3.

much
harder

same

Please rate how you think you did on this task:

0----1----2----3----4----s----6----7----s----9----10

very
poorly

very
well

4.
Please rate how you think you did on this task compared
to other people in the study:

0----1----2----3----4----s----6----1----s----9----10

much
worse

s.

much
better

same

Was your performance a success or a failure? Circle one.
success

failure

6. were you aware of using any kind of strategies during
this experiment (e.g., something to help you succeed or
fail, something to avoid the second task, etc.)? circle one:
yes
no
Describe the strategies in the space below.
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Z.D #
PA

1. To what extent was it important to you to do well at
this task?

0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----a----9----10

not at
all

very
much

2. To what extent was your performance on the task due to
how easy or difficult the task was?

0----1----2----3----4----s----&----7----a----9----10

not at
all

very
much

3. To what extent was your success or failure due to how
much effort you put into doing the task?

0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----a----9----10

not at
all

very
much

4. To what extent was your success or failure due to your
ability?

0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----a----9----10

not at
all

very
much

s. What is your level of ability for succeeding at such
tasks?
0----1----2----3----4----s----6----7----a----9----10

low
6.

high

To what extent was your success or failure due to luck?

0----1----2----3----4----s----6----7----a----9----10

not at
all

very
much

7. To what extent was your success or failure under your
control?

0----1----2----3----4----s----6----7----a----9----10

not at
all

very
much
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s.

To what extent did your task partner influence your
success or failure?

0----1----2----3----4----s----&----7----a----9----10very

not at
all

much

9. was this influence positive or neqative? (Skip if you
answered 11 not at all" to fS.)

0----1----2----3----4----s----&----1----a----9----10

neqative
positive

Explain your response to #8 in the space below.

10. Was the cause of your success or failure due to
somethinq about you (internal) or somethinq about the
circumstances or other people (external)?
internal 1----2----3----4----s----6 external
Write in the space below one major cause for your success or
failure on the task.

11. In the future when doinq a task like this, to what
extent will this cause be present?
never 1----2----3----4----s----6 always

12. Is this cause somethinq that just affects doinq this
kind of task, or does it also influence other areas of your
life?
this type 1----2----3----4----s----6 other areas
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I.D.#
PARTNER EVALUATION
PART I - POSITIVE FEEDBACK

on this page, please evaluate your task partner's positive
qualities with regard to the following dimensions:

What were your immediate positive impressions of your
partner?

What did you like best about your partner?

How important is the above mentioned quality, in your
opinion?

0------1------2------3------4------5------6-------7-------8

not
very
at all

In what sort of occupation do you think your partner would
excel?

How important is such an occupation?

0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8very

not
at all

Describe what you liked best about your interaction with
your partner?
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PART II - NEGATIVE FEEDBACK

on this page, please evaluate your partner's negative
qualities, with regard to the following dimensions:
What were your immediate negative impressions of your
partner?

What did you like least about your partner?

How negativ·e is the above-mentioned quality?

0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8very

mildly

What did you like least about your interaction with your
partner?

How aversive was the interaction?

0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8very

mildly
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I.D.f
Feedback Information
Read the following, and when you have responded to the
items, ask the experimenter to give you the feedback forms.
You and your task partner will provide feedback on each
other. We want you to give your opinion of your partner.
If time remains, you will be given this feedback from your
partner, by the experimenter. occassionally, we do not have
sufficient time to go over this feedback with you. If time
is short, you may choose one section of your partner's
feedback about you: the positive part or the negative part.
If this happens, please indicate below which kind of
feedback you would choose to receive. Circle one:
negative feedback

positive feedback

Please indicate how important this feedback is to you:

0----1----2----3----4----s----&----7----s----9----10

not at
all

very
much

Now, please ask the experimenter to give you the feedback
forms.
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Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of the
study is to gain information about how our affective state
(i.e., feelings) can impact performance and interpersonal
relationships.
In this study, you were teamed with a partner. This partner
was actually a research confederate. S/he always takes the
role of timer/transcriber, while subjects like you always
complete the actual task.
One area we are investigating is
sorting task varies depending on
depressed or not depressed) and
subjects think they were expected
not).

how performance on the
subjects' affect (i.e. ,
expectations (i.e. , did
to do a second task, or

One part of the study involved asking you to choose either
positive or negative feedback about yourself, from the
feedback sheet your partner would then complete. In fact,
there were no feedback sheets; the confederate does not rate
your performance in any way. We are interested in how the
feedback choices subjects make vary depending on their
affective state.
You should remember that your responses are confidential, and
that you will not be identified as a subject in this study.
For this project, we are concerned with average responses
rather than individual ones. We combine the responses from
everybody in the study, and look at how subjects responded,
collectively.
If you have any questions or comments, or are interested in
receiving feedback, contact Dr. Jeanne Albright of the
Psychology Department, 1046 Damen Hall, 508-2971.

PLEASE do not discuss this experiment with other students who
have
not
yet
participated.
Thanks
again
for
your
participation!
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